(ACT) Prohibit Election Deepfakes
- Naomi Bagle-Zevin, Ishaanaah Ravi, Kieran Zucconi, Cas Maclean & Shrikaavya Karthikeyan
- May 30
- 7 min read
Author: Naomi Bagle-Zevin, Ishaanaah Ravi, Kieran Zucconi, Cas Maclean & Shrikaavya Karthikeyan | Publish date: 30/5/2026
P: In the ACT, electoral law does not prohibit the distribution of materially deceptive AI-generated audio or visual media (deepfakes) in electoral advertising.
S: The ACT Attorney-General should amend Section 297A of the Electoral Act 1992 (ACT) to prohibit the distribution of materially deceptive AI-generated audio or visual media in electoral advertising for the purpose of influencing an election, with exceptions for satirical content.
E: Dr Yee-Fui Ng, Associate Professor in Law at Monash University: ‘There should be bans on the distribution of materially deceptive AI-generated audio or visual media in carrying out an election for the purposes of influencing an election … Exceptions may be required for satirical content.’
Problem Identification:
Section 297A of the Electoral Act 1992 (ACT) (the Act) states that it is an offence to distribute an electoral advertisement that ‘contains a statement purporting to be a statement of fact that is inaccurate and misleading to a material extent.’ However, according to the ACT Electoral Commission (ACT EC), the Act does not explicitly prohibit the distribution of materially deceptive artificial intelligence (AI)-generated audio or visual media, also known as deepfakes, in electoral advertising.
Researchers from the NSW Parliamentary Research Service noted that ‘political deepfakes threaten to undermine elections and democracy by limiting the ability of people to exercise their free and informed choice as voters and by reducing their confidence in the integrity of elections and democratic institutions.’ In 2025, Adobe reported that Australians are ‘concerned about the impact of harmful deepfakes on the federal election and democracy’.
Context:
A deepfake refers to a ‘digital photo, video or sound file of a real person that has been edited to create an extremely realistic but false depiction of them doing or saying something that they did not actually do or say.’ According to the eSafety Commissioner ‘advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning … [allow it to] generate content that is extremely realistic, almost impossible to detect with the naked eye and difficult to debunk.’ Women’s Agenda further reported that ‘ahead of the 2025 federal election, nearly nine in 10 Australians said they were concerned AI-altered images make it harder to distinguish fact from fiction.’
The eSafety Commissioner further observed that ‘the development of innovations to help identify deepfakes is not yet keeping pace with the technology itself.’
Arguments:
According to the ACT EC, deepfakes can ‘bring significant risks to the conduct of elections and democracy more generally.’ Hannah Smith (Researcher at The Australian Strategic Policy Institute) and co-author Katherine Mansted (Senior Advisor for public policy at the ANU's National Security College), argued that deepfakes can ‘accelerate the spread of propaganda and disinformation online and exacerbate declining trust in democratic institutions.’ To demonstrate the dangers of deepfakes, ABC News commissioned the creation of a deepfake of an Australian senator in 2025, calling for the legalisation of cannabis. The depicted senator called the deepfake ‘uncomfortably persuasive’. Bill Browne, Director of the Democracy and Accountability Program at The Australia Institute, stated that ‘even if disinformation does not change an election result, it can still undermine public confidence and trust’ in the democratic process.
The Act was recently amended in 2021 to establish a new offence for inaccurate and misleading electoral advertising. However, the ACT EC stated that the current regulation is ‘insufficient’ and ‘does not currently address the threat of deepfakes … directly.’ According to the ANU Law Reform and Social Justice (LRSJ) Research Hub, deepfakes ‘pose a significant challenge that the Electoral Act is poorly equipped to address in its current state.’
Adobe’s report found that 82% of participants surveyed (Australians) believed that the government ‘isn’t doing enough to protect people from harmful deepfakes … in political content.’
Advice/Solution Identification:
Dr Yee-Fui Ng and the ANU LRSJ Research Hub have called for a ban on the use of deepfakes in electoral material. Dr Ng noted that this change could ‘curtail the potential manipulation of voters at the individual level’. The ANU LRSJ Research Hub further highlighted that it could ‘protect both the implied freedom of political communication and the fundamental integrity of the ACT’s electoral process from modern threats.’
Precedent:
There is domestic precedent for prohibiting election deepfakes. In 2025, SA enacted new legislation to prohibit the distribution of deceptive election deepfakes. In 2026, NSW enacted a similar provision in their electoral legislation, also prohibiting deceptive electoral deepfakes.
Public Support:
Broad Support:
ACT Electoral Commission - Called for a review of regulatory responses to AI-generated political deepfakes. However, they have not explicitly called for a legislative ban.
Federal Select Committee on Adopting Artificial Intelligence (AI) - Called for a thorough review of potential regulatory responses to political deepfake content, including potential prohibitions on the production or dissemination of political deepfake content during election periods. However, they have not explicitly recommended a legislative ban on political deepfakes in the ACT.
Bill Browne, Director of Democracy and Accountability Program, The Australia Institute - Called for stronger truth in political advertising laws in all states. However, they have not explicitly called for a legislative ban on deepfakes in the ACT.
This list reflects publicly stated positions and should not necessarily be taken as endorsement of this specific brief.
News Coverage:
ABC News - “Deepfakes and falsehoods are legal in political advertising. Not everyone is on board with fixing it”. This article noted that deepfakes and other false claims in political advertising are largely legal in Australia and argued that current laws are struggling to keep up with AI-generated misinformation. By: Matt Martino | 15 October 2024 - Read the article here.
The Conversation - “Disinformation and deepfakes played a part in the US election. Australia should expect the same”. This article warned that AI-generated disinformation significantly influenced the 2024 US presidential election and urged Australia to prepare for similar challenges. By: Renne Barnes, Aimee Riedel, Lucas Whittaker and Rory Mulcahy | 21 November 2024 - Read the article here.
The Guardian - “Queensland premier rules out AI-generated election material after LNP releases dancing TikTok attack advertisement”. This article reported that QLD Premier Steven Miles condemned an AI-generated TikTok video posted by the Liberal National Party (LNP) opposition depicting him dancing to mock rising rents and power bills under Labor calling it a ‘turning point for democracy’. By: Andrew Messenger | 23 July 2024 - Read the article here.
Canberra CityNews - “Deepfakes harder to detect spurring election concerns”. This article warned that democracies are being undermined by the spread of disinformation, and as deepfakes become more advanced, they are increasingly difficult to detect, intensifying their reach and impact. By: Dominic Giannini | 13 March 2025 - Read the article here.
Where to go to learn more:
(2025) Submission to the Inquiry into the operation of the 2024 ACT Election and Electoral Act 1992 | ANU LRSJ Research Hub - This submission evaluated the legal and operational frameworks of the 2024 ACT Election. They recommended that the use of deceptive political deepfakes be banned by expanding the definition of misleading conduct in the ACT electoral legislation. View the report here.
(2025) Report on the ACT Legislative Assembly Election 2024 | ACT Electoral Commission - This report reviewed the conduct of the 2024 ACT Legislative Assembly election held in 2024. They recommended that the Assembly review potential regulatory responses to AI-generated political deepfake content for legislative implementation before the 2028 ACT election. Read the full report here.
(2024) Interim Report | Federal Select Committee on Adopting Artificial Intelligence (AI) - This report considered the potential impacts of AI technology on democratic and electoral processes in Australia, as well as potential policy responses (Chapter 2). They recommended a review of potential regulatory responses to electoral deepfake content, including a ban on political deepfake content during election periods. View the report here.
(2024) Adopting AI in Australia | Australia Human Rights Commission - This submission to the Federal Select Committee on Adopting Artificial Intelligence recommended that the Australian government should introduce specific legislation that addresses AI-generated electoral materials that promote disinformation. View the report here.
(2025) Authenticity in the Age of AI: Australia | Adobe - This report surveyed Australians to explore their confidence, competence and perspectives when navigating content online, focusing on the impact of AI-generated content and deepfakes in an election year. Read the full report here.
Electoral Act 1992 (ACT) - Read the full Act here.
Human Perspective:
Anita is a 34-year-old woman living in Canberra who casually follows election news through social media. Just a week before the ACT elections, she saw a video involving a candidate admitting to accepting illegal donations. The video looked convincing, and as more friends and colleagues shared it, she started to believe the allegations were true. Anita quickly shared this video with her family and friends, warning them about the candidate. Within hours, Anita saw the video growing all over her social media pages, with people shaping opinions, which reinforced her distrust. Anita carried this negative view of the candidate into the voting booth. After the election, she learnt that the video was a deepfake and felt misled, questioning how she was meant to tell the difference. She also realised that a correction had been made before the election, but it had reached far fewer people. Anita realised how vulnerable she was to deceptive electoral content online and how easily it could shape her choices and trust in the electoral process.
To protect the anonymity of those involved, this is a fictionalised account drawn from an amalgamation of real-life stories, experiences and testimonials gathered during the research process for this brief. Any resemblance to actual individuals is purely coincidental.
Conflict of interest/acknowledgment statement:
N/A
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Reference list:
ACT Electoral Commission. (2025). Report on the ACT Legislative Assembly Election 2024. https://www.parliament.act.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/2900763/D1-Electoral-Commission-report.pdf
Adobe. (2025). Authenticity in the Age of AI: Australia. https://www.adobe.com/content/dam/cc/au/newsroom/pdf/2025/Authenticity_in_Age_of_AI_Australia_April_2025.pdf
ANU Law Reform and Social Justice (LRSJ) Research Hub. (2025). Integrity Submission 030 – Inquiry into the operation of the 2024 ACT Election and Electoral Act 1992. https://www.parliament.act.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/2969866/Integrity-Submission-030-ANU-Law-Reform-and-Social-Justice-Research-Hubs.pdf
Australian Electoral Commission. (n.d.). Disinformation and Misinformation [Factsheet]. https://www.aec.gov.au/About_AEC/files/eiat/eiat-disinformation-factsheet.pdf
Australian Electoral Commission. (n.d.). Misleading electoral advertising. https://www.elections.act.gov.au/integrity/misleading-electoral-advertising
Browne, B. (2026). Chat regarding political deepfakes in Australia [Video call with Director of the Democracy & Accountability Program, The Australia Institute]. 16/04/2026. eSafety Commissioner. (2022). Deepfake trends and challenges - position statement. https://www.esafety.gov.au/sites/default/files/2022-01/Deepfake-position-statement _v2.pdf
Electoral Act 1992 (ACT). https://legislation.act.gov.au/View/GetHTMLFile/a/1992-71/current/html/1992-71.html#_Toc213082000:~:text=of a vote.-,297A,Misleading electoral advertising,-(1)
Electoral Act 2017 (NSW). https://legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/html/inforce/current/act-2017-066#sec.189A
Electoral Miscellaneous Amendment Act 2024 (SA). https://www.legislation.sa.gov.au/_legislation-documents/lz/v/a/2024/electoral-miscellaneous-amendment-act-2024_67/2024.67.un.pdf
Hislop, M. (2025, February 23). AI deepfakes are warping Australian politics. Women’s Agenda. https://womensagenda.com.au/latest/ai-deepfakes-are-warping-australian-politics-pauline-hanson-is-in-the-middle-of-it/
Grant, J. I. (2019). Fighting the deepfakes arms race. eSafety Commissioner. https://www.esafety.gov.au/newsroom/blogs/fighting-the-deepfakes-arms-race
Manfield, E. (2025, January 31). Could deepfakes effect the election [Radio]. ABC Listen. https://www.abc.net.au/listen/programs/am/could-deepfakes-effect-the-election-/104880320
Manfield, E., & Doran, M. (2025, January 31). Politicians fear deepfakes could impact election. ABC News. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-01-31/politicians-fear-deepfakes-could-impact-election/104876130
Ng, Y. F. (2025). Integrity Submission 009 – Inquiry into the operation of the 2024 ACT Election and Electoral Act 1992. https://www.parliament.act.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/2969836/Integrity-Submission-009-Yee-Fui-Ng.pdf
Roth, L., & Gotsis, T. (2026). Political deepfakes and the new laws in NSW (Research Paper No. 2, 2026). NSW Parliamentary Research Service. https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/researchpapers/Pages/Political-deepfakes-and-the-new-laws-in-NSW.aspx
The Australia Institute. (2022). Fortifying Australian democracy – Submission to the inquiry into the 2022 election. https://australiainstitute.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/P1267-Australia-Institute-Fortifying-Australian-democracy-Web.pdf




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